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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE MOSAIC: 
IMPROVING REGULATION FD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of selective disclosure, which occurs when a stock issuer 
provides material, non-public information about a company to a stock 
analyst before disclosing it to the general public,1 continues to trouble the 
SEC.2 The SEC encourages issuers to disclose information to analysts in 
order to enhance market efficiency;3 however, the SEC prohibits issuers 
from disclosing material information to analysts, finding such disclosures 
unfair to the investing public.4 Furthermore, the SEC fails to clearly define 
materiality, adopting the amorphous reasonable person standard for 
materiality developed in existing case law.5 As a result, the SEC provides 
issuers little guidance as they attempt to disclose important, but not 
material, information to analysts.6 
The SEC traditionally proscribed selective disclosure under insider 
trading law, imposing liability for any trading that occurred on the basis of 
selectively disclosed material information.7 The Supreme Court, however, 
 1. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter Final Rule]. Issuers selectively disclose 
information to various persons, but this Note focuses on selective disclosure to analysts.  
 2. See Paul P. Brountas, Jr., Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities 
Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1531-33 (1992) (noting that the SEC attempts to maintain markets 
that are both fair and efficient, concerns that conflict in the context of selective disclosure).  
 3. See id. at 1533 (“The securities market is said to be efficient when stock prices fully reflect 
all available information relevant to stock values.”). The prevailing theory of market efficiency is the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), which indicates that when new information becomes 
available, it is promptly incorporated in the price of the stock through trading. Id. at 1532. For further 
discussion of pricing efficiency, see generally Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An 
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) 
(discussing the ability of the market to incorporate available information).  
 4. See Brountas, supra note 2, at 1531 (discussing the role of fairness in the SEC’s disclosure 
policy). The SEC premised Regulation FD (“Fair Disclosure”) primarily on fairness considerations. 
See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.C.3. See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 
(1988). In Basic, the Supreme Court adopted the materiality standard articulated in TSC Indus. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Id. at 232. This standard provides that information is 
material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” 
in making an investment decision. 426 U.S. at 449. In addition, there must be a substantial likelihood 
that a fact “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id. 
 6. See Brountas, supra note 2, at 1524-25 (noting that the materiality standard places issuers in 
a difficult situation with respect to disclosure to analysts). 
 7. See id. at 1528-29 (discussing traditional liability for selective disclosure). See also 
discussion infra Part II.A.2. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider 
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rejected the SEC’s “disclose or abstain” rule, stating that such a rule would 
inhibit the communications between issuer and analyst that are crucial for 
market efficiency.8 The Court noted that the imprecise materiality standard 
provided by the SEC9 would render a “disclose or abstain” rule 
unworkable because it failed to provide analysts or issuers proper 
guidance for structuring communications.10 
The SEC addressed its inability to prohibit selective disclosure under 
insider trading law11 with the adoption of Regulation FD (“Fair 
Disclosure”), which prohibits such disclosures under the reporting 
requirements.12 Regulation FD provides that when an issuer, or person 
acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain 
enumerated persons,13 the issuer must make that information publicly 
available.14 Under Regulation FD, the SEC expressly authorized issuers to 
selectively disclose immaterial information;15 however, it did not define 
materiality, relying instead on the definition developed in case law.16 The 
SEC stated that a general definition of materiality was necessary in order 
to provide the flexibility to weigh the facts and circumstances of each 
case.17  
The Proposing Release18 of Regulation FD generated many comments 
on the materiality standard.19 Many commenters, including securities 
industry representatives, securities lawyers, and some issuers, asserted that 
Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 443, 450-59 
(2000) (analyzing the fairness/efficiency controversy in the context of insider trading). 
 8. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely 
because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it 
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is 
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”).  
 9. Id. at 659 n.17 (noting that SEC guidance on materiality was “inherently imprecise”). 
 10. Id. (stating that “[u]nless the parties have some guidance as to where the line is between 
permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure 
when the line is crossed”). 
 11. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,716 & n.7 (stating that the status of selective disclosure 
under insider trading law is unclear due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC).  
 12. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2001). 
 13. Id. at § 243.100(b)(1). See infra note 73. 
 14. Id. at § 243.100(a). 
 15. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,722 (“[A]n issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-
material piece of information to an analyst.”). 
 16. Id. at 51,721. See supra note 5. 
 17. Id. The SEC stated, “[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always 
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be over- or 
under-inclusive.” Id. (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 236). 
 18. Selective Disclosure of Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) [hereinafter Proposing Release].  
 19. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721. 
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the general materiality standard was too vague for issuer personnel to use 
in making real time disclosure judgments under Regulation FD.20 
Commenters claimed that Regulation FD would produce a “chilling 
effect” on informal communication by inhibiting an issuer’s ability to 
provide immaterial information for fear that the information may be 
deemed material.21 
Although adopted on October 23, 2000, Regulation FD remains a 
contentious area of the law.22 Regulation FD was intended to “level [the] 
playing field” between individual investors and market insiders by 
encouraging broad dissemination of information.23 However, in its haste to 
protect the investing public from the unfairness of selective disclosure, the 
SEC ignored the Supreme Court’s earlier warning and created risks to 
market efficiency by prohibiting selective disclosure without providing a 
clear materiality standard.24 As a result, Regulation FD threatens to imperil 
market efficiency, which may harm the investors the SEC intended to 
protect.25  
The SEC should amend Regulation FD to include a bright-line 
 20. Id. See, e.g., Letter of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Business 
Law Section of the American Bar Association to Securities and Exchange Commission, at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/keller2.htm (May 8, 2000) (stating that materiality standard 
was too unclear and complex a standard for issuer personnel to use in making real time judgments 
about disclosure) [hereinafter ABA Letter]; Letter of the Securities Industry Association to Securities 
and Exchange Commission, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/spencer1.htm (Apr. 6, 2000) 
(stating the vagueness of the standard would lead to litigation and a chilling effect on corporate 
disclosure) [hereinafter SIA Letter]. But, cf., Letter of the Financial Executives Institute to Securities 
Exchange Commission at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/ameen1.htm (Apr. 24, 2000) 
(“Materiality is inevitably a judgement (sic) call, easy to make at the extremes, and often difficult 
inside the range. We do not believe definition beyond what is already in the release would change this 
circumstance.”). 
 21. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 20 (“[W]e are 
concerned that the rulemaking approach proposed by the Commission . . . runs a significant risk of 
chilling the accelerating pace of information flow to the markets.”). 
 22. See American Bar Association Section of Business Law Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, Report on Regulation FD (2002), at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/fedsec/ 
20020206report.pdf (stating that Regulation FD has continued to be controversial) [hereinafter ABA 
Report].  
 23. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,716. “[M]any issuers are disclosing important nonpublic 
information . . . to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full 
disclosure of the same information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were 
privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those 
kept in the dark.” Id. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 25. See Jason Michael Craft, What’s All the Commotion?: An Examination of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 119, 160 (2001) (“It is likely that 
through the effects of Regulation FD, the SEC will actually have hurt the individual investor as well as 
the stability and efficiency of the market as a whole.”). For a discussion of the value analysts provide 
to investors, see infra Part II.A.1. 
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definition of materiality. A clearer standard would allow Regulation FD to 
operate as envisioned by the SEC, preventing the selective disclosure of 
material information without chilling the dissemination of immaterial 
information.26  
Part II of this Note will examine the historical legal treatment of 
selective disclosure and the Regulation FD initiative. Part III will examine 
Regulation FD’s effects on market efficiency. Finally, Part IV will 
propose that the SEC should improve Regulation FD by providing a 
bright-line definition of materiality. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Traditional Role of Security Analysts  
1. Providing Value 
The SEC has long acknowledged that stock analysts play a crucial role 
in marketplace efficiency by disseminating additional information into the 
market that is incorporated into market prices.27 Analysts collect and 
analyze information about issuers, markets, and general economic 
conditions.28 “A skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the 
industry may piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public 
information into a mosaic which reveals material non-public [sic] 
information.”29 This process of “completing the mosaic”30 requires market 
 26. Despite commenters’ concern that Regulation FD would impair market efficiency by 
restricting issuer communications, the SEC continued to assert that Regulation FD would in effect 
promote market efficiency by encouraging broader disclosure of information. Final Rule, supra note 1, 
at 51,719 (“Regulation FD . . . should promote full and fair disclosure of information by issuers and 
enhance the fairness and efficiency of our markets.”). 
 27. See Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 191 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 83,939, at 83,945 (Jan. 21, 1981), rev’d by Dirks, supra note 8.  
Such individuals are in the business of formulating opinions and insights—not obvious to the 
general investing public—concerning the attractiveness of particular securities. In the course 
of their work, analysts actively seek out bits and pieces of corporate information not generally 
known to the market for the express purpose of analyzing that information and informing 
their clients who, in turn, can be expected to trade on the basis of the information conveyed. 
The value to the entire market of these efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing 
is significantly enhanced by such initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus 
the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of all investors.  
Id. 
 28. See Donald C. Langevoort, Essay, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 
VA. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (1990) (discussing the process of collection and analysis of information by 
investment analysts). 
 29. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 30. Id.  
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expertise and diligence in order to effectively seek out and interpret 
information.31 The dissemination of additional market information is 
incorporated into stock prices, which provides investors with the benefit of 
buying at a stock price that more closely reflects value.32  
Analysts collect information from various sources, including public 
sources,33 external sources,34 and, perhaps most importantly, directly from 
issuers. Direct contacts, such as one-on-one meetings or telephone 
discussions, allow analysts "to fill out the picture thus far drawn and to 
facilitate an accurate assessment of information previously generated.”35 
Direct contacts also allow analysts to probe into the operations of issuers 
on a sophisticated level36 and to fill in the informational gaps of publicly 
disclosed information.37  
Additionally, analysts play an important role in verifying information 
provided by issuers.38 Analyst recommendations provide credibility to 
information releases that may otherwise be suspect.39 Particularly in the 
case of small issuers,40 analyst validation stimulates investor interest in 
corporations that they may otherwise overlook.41 
 31. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d 565 F.2d 
8 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Analysts provide a needed service in culling and sifting available data, viewing it in 
light of their own knowledge of a particular industry and ultimately furnishing a distilled product in 
the form of reports.”). 
 32. See Brountas, supra note 2, at 1539 (discussing analysts role in ensuring that information is 
incorporated into stock prices). 
 This argument assumes that analysts are actually performing market analysis and providing 
unbiased recommendations. See discussion at supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Lewis D. Solomon & Dan Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b-5: Legal 
Standards, Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 505, 516 (1975) (listing public sources, including material filed with various public regulatory 
bodies, press releases, newspapers, and trade publications).  
 34. Id. at 517 (listing external sources, including suppliers, competitors, and market trends that 
allow an analyst to evaluate an issuer’s prospects in relation to the market as a whole). 
 35. Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1026. Corporate attendance at analyst conferences was 
prevalent and the practice of issuers reviewing analyst reports and making changes or suggestions had 
become common. Id. See also Soloman & Wilke, supra note 33, at 516. 
 36. See Craft, supra note 25, at 127 (noting that selectively disclosed information is too complex 
for effective use by the vast majority of individual investors).  
 37. Id. at 126. Particularly in the case of small issuers about which there is little publicly 
available information, direct contact with analysts is crucial in order to provide information to the 
investment community. For a discussion of the importance of analysts’ interstitial role, see Brountas, 
supra note 2, at 1539-40. 
 38. See Brountas, supra note 2, at 1540 (noting that disclosures to analysts result in an implied 
warranty of truthfulness when the information eventually enters the market). 
 39. Id. (noting that the corporation’s credibility is enhanced when information is communicated 
through an objective expert). 
 40. Id. at 1541 (noting that information disclosed by small corporations is often received with 
suspicion). 
 41. Id. at 1542 (stating that analysts serve a vital role in providing voice and credibility to smaller 
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2. The Conflict 
The SEC placed issuers and analysts in a difficult situation by 
encouraging issuers to provide analysts with meaningful immaterial 
information42 without disclosing material information, while providing 
only a vague reasonable person standard of materiality.43 Under existing 
case law, information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making an 
investment decision.44 In addition, there must be a substantial likelihood 
that a fact “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the total mix of information made available.”45 This 
amorphous standard granted the SEC broad discretion in determining 
which incidents to pursue. 
Complicating matters further, the SEC applied the materiality standard 
unpredictably. For example, in Bausch & Lomb,46 the SEC brought a Rule 
10b-547 action against Bausch & Lomb and its chairman of the board. The 
SEC charged the parties with the selective disclosure of material 
information based on several one-on-one interviews with analysts in which 
the chairman discussed sales information and the introduction of new 
corporations of which investors are unaware). 
 42. See Solomon & Wilke, supra note 33, at 516, n.43 (quoting the SEC statement that “[w]e 
also recognize that discussions between corporate management and groups of analysts which provide a 
forum for filling interstices in analysis, for forming a direct impression of the quality of management, 
or for testing the meaning of public information, may be of value”) (quoting Investors Mgmt. Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,163, at 
80,521 (July 29, 1971).  
 43. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (criticizing the SEC for failing to 
provide additional guidance regarding materiality). See also Elkind, supra note 29, at 165 (“Whenever 
managers and analysts meet elsewhere than in public, there is a risk that the analysts will emerge with 
knowledge of material information which is not publicly available.”). 
 44. TSC, supra note 5, at 449. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Supra note 43. 
 47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. 
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products, as well as the probable range for the corporation’s quarterly 
earnings.48 The SEC contended that the disclosures were per se material 
due to subsequent price movements in Bausch & Lomb’s stock.49 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the SEC’s hindsight 
materiality approach, holding that subsequent price movements alone did 
not indicate that the disclosures were material.50 The court recognized that 
the current materiality standard placed issuers in a difficult situation when 
communicating with analysts51 and criticized the SEC for failing to 
provide written guidelines for determining materiality.52  
B. Judicial Balance  
Traditionally, the lower courts applied a “disclose or abstain” rule, 
which imposed insider trading liability on both the issuer and the analyst if 
the analyst, when gaining material nonpublic information, failed to 
publicly disclose the information or abstain from trading.53 This standard 
created a significant deterrent to selective disclosure, especially in light of 
the broad interpretation of materiality applied by the SEC.54 
During the early 1980s, the Supreme Court significantly weakened the 
SEC’s “disclose or abstain” standard55 and rejected the standard outright in 
 48. Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d at 9-14. The SEC was apparently aware of the issuer’s policy of 
carefully monitoring discussions with analysts and the unusual circumstances surrounding the 
disclosure in the instance attacked, but insisted that this instance of providing inside information was a 
violation of Rule 10b-5. Id.  
 49. Id. at 15. 
 50. Id. at 15-16 (stating price volatility is not a per se indication that information conveyed was 
material, especially when other factors were sufficient to induce the fluctuation).  
 The court further denied injunctive relief pursuant to rule 10b-5 because the SEC had not 
established that the chairman had acted with scienter and had failed to show a reasonable likelihood of 
future violations. Id. at 18-19. In considering materiality, the court noted that the SEC itself recognized 
that communications that merely test the meaning of public information are not inappropriate. Id. at 
14. The court also found it significant that analysts receiving identical information had disparate 
reactions. Id. at 18. 
 51. Id. at 9 (analogizing an interview with a financial analyst to a “fencing match conducted on a 
tightrope”). 
 52. See id. at 10 (stating that “materiality has become one of the most unpredictable and elusive 
concepts of the federal securities laws,” and noting that the SEC’s failure to provide written guidelines 
resulted in an after-the-fact case-by-case approach).  
 53. See Brountas, supra note 2, at 1528. 
 54. See id. at 1549 (stating that the liability scheme under rule 10b-5 creates a “considerable 
disincentive” to selective disclosure). 
 55. The Supreme Court made the first step in the abandonment of the traditional liability 
standard in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In that case, the Court abandoned the 
“disclose or abstain” rule and established that there could be no violation of Rule 10b-5 unless a 
fiduciary relationship existed between the issuer and the person trading on the material nonpublic 
information; mere possession of material nonpublic information was not enough. See Brountas, supra 
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the seminal case of Dirks v. SEC.56 In Dirks, the SEC censured a security 
analyst for aiding and abetting violations of Rule 10b-5.57 The security 
analyst received material nonpublic information regarding fraudulent 
corporate practices from a former officer of the issuer, who urged Dirks to 
verify the fraud and disclose it publicly.58 While investigating the 
allegations, which led to public disclosure of the fraud, Dirks discussed the 
information with clients who sold their stock.59  
The Court denied Rule 10b-5 liability without deciding whether the 
information was material.60 Rejecting the “disclose or abstain” rule that 
imposed liability on the issuer and the analyst whenever trading occurred 
on the basis of selectively disclosed material information, the Court 
formulated a “personal benefit” test that required proof of some advantage 
to the issuer from the disclosure before an analyst could be liable for 
insider trading.61  
The Court specifically noted that imposing a duty to disclose or abstain 
solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic 
information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting 
influence on the role of the market analyst.62 The Court endorsed the 
analyst’s ability to “ferret out and analyze information”63 and stated that 
not all disclosures of material information are inconsistent with an issuer’s 
fiduciary duties.64 The Court stated: “In some situations, the insider will 
act consistently with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of 
the information may affect the market.”65 The Court noted that due to the 
imprecision of the reasonable person materiality standard, liability for 
selective disclosure of information must turn on the purpose of the 
disclosure.66 
note 2, at 1529. 
 56. Supra note 8. 
 57. Id. at 650-52. 
 58. Id. at 648-49. 
 59. Id. at 649. 
 60. Id. at 665 & n.25.  
 61. Id. at 667. Under the personal benefit test, analysts who receive material nonpublic 
information from insiders are liable for insider trading only if the insider breached a fiduciary duty for 
personal gain and the analyst knew or should have known of the breach. Id. at 661-64. As the insiders 
in this instance disclosed information to reveal fraud, there was no breach of fiduciary duty and, hence, 
there could be no derivative liability to the analyst. Id. at 667. 
 62. Id. at. 658. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 661-62. 
 65. Id. at 662. 
 66. Id. at 662-63 (“It is important in this type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they 
do . . . rather than on policing information per se and its possession.”) (quoting Investors Mgmt. Co., 
supra note 42, at 80,523 (Smith, Comm’r, concurring)). 
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The personal benefit test formulated in Dirks made it considerably 
more difficult to prohibit selective disclosure of material information 
under insider trading law.67 Some commentators interpreted Dirks as 
creating a “paean to the analyst,”68 and the market generally believed that 
issuer communications with analysts held a privileged status.69 Many 
commentators interpreted Dirks as a Supreme Court endorsement of 
selective disclosure between an issuer and an analyst in order to protect 
market efficiency.70  
C. The Regulation FD Response 
Seventeen years after the Dirks decision, the SEC renewed its attack on 
selective disclosure by proposing Regulation FD.71 Regulation FD, a 
reporting obligation,72 provides that whenever an issuer or person acting 
 67. See Proposing Release, supra note 18, at 72,593, in which the SEC stated, “many have 
viewed Dirks as affording considerable protection to insiders who make selective disclosures to 
analysts, and to the analysts (and their clients) who receive selectively disclosed information.”  
 The SEC however did not accept defeat in Dirks. Rather, in United States v. Stevens, Litigation 
Release No. 12813, 48 SEC Docket (CCH) ¶ 739, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451 (Mar. 19, 1991), the SEC 
attempted to apply a “reputation benefit” standard under the personal benefit test, which would allow 
enforcement against the issuer if the information was disclosed to enhance the issuers reputation. Id. 
This rule was seen as trivializing the holding in Dirks. Coffee, supra note 68, at 5. The defendant in 
Stevens settled and the case was never validated in the federal courts. Id. However, it sent a clear 
signal to issuers and analysts that selective disclosure remained precarious activity. Id. at 6. For further 
discussion, see id. 
 68. Brountas, supra note 2, at 1529 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Securities 
Analyst, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1991, at 5, 6) (quoting Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
769 (2d ed. 1988)).  
 69. See, e.g., Anthony T. Horgan, Comment, Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective 
Disclosure High Wire, 46 VILL. L. REV. 645, 652 (2001) (noting that after Dirks, corporate 
communications with analysts appeared to enjoy a special status); Daniel J. Kramer, Speaking to the 
Market Under SEC’s Proposed Rule, 223 N.Y. L.J., May 12, 2000, at 38 (noting that since Dirks, 
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by issuers to analysts “has become widely 
accepted”). See also Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning 
Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (1985) (proposing federal securities law amendment 
to prohibit any person from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information to address 
the confusion and enforcement difficulties created by Dirks).  
 70. See Clay Richards, Comment, Selective Disclosure: “A Fencing Match Conducted on a 
Tightrope” and Regulation FD—the SEC’s Latest Attempt to “Electrify the Tightrope,” 70 MISS. L.J. 
417, 439 (2000) (noting the balance Dirks created between fairness and efficiency, allowing some 
market unfairness in order to promote greater market efficiency). 
 71. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2001). Some commentators have questioned 
the SEC’s authority to make such a rule. See SIA Letter, supra note 20 n.6 (stating “we seriously doubt 
that the Commission has authority to adopt a general requirement that registrants promptly disclose 
publicly and report to the Commission all material developments or facts relevant to the issuer. We 
wonder whether it is that much different to impose an obligation to disclose a material development or 
fact just because it has been disclosed to an outsider.”). 
 
 72. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,726 (stating Regulation FD creates duties only under 
Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act and Section 30 of the Investment Company Act).  
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on his behalf discloses material nonpublic information to certain 
enumerated persons,73 the issuer must make public disclosure of that same 
information.74 If the disclosure is intentional, public disclosure must occur 
simultaneously;75 if it is unintentional, the disclosure must occur 
promptly.76 The regulation was intended to apply primarily to securities 
management professionals and individual investors who would be 
expected to trade on the information at an advantage to the investing 
public.77 The SEC provided several exemptions78 to ensure that ordinary 
business communications would not be prohibited.79  
The SEC intended Regulation FD to be enforced only through SEC 
actions80 and indicated that private liability for violations of Regulation 
FD was not available.81 The SEC explicitly stated that violations of 
Regulation FD could not provide a basis for private liability under Rule 
10b-5;82 however, concern among issuers remained because violations of 
Regulation FD provided plaintiff investors with several of the elements of 
a Rule 10b-5 violation.83  
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1). Certain enumerated persons include (1) a broker or dealer, or a 
person associated with a broker or dealer, (2) an investment adviser, an institutional investment 
manager, or a person associated with either, (3) an investment company or an affiliated person, and (4) 
a holder of the issuer’s securities who is likely to trade on the basis of the information. Id. 
 74. Id. at § 243.100(a). Public disclosure may be effected by furnishing a report under Item 9 of 
Form 8-K, filing a report under Item 5, or disseminating the information through a method that is 
reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public. 
Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,723. However, a posting of information on an issuer’s website is not 
alone sufficient. Id. at 51,724. 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1). 
 76. Id. at § 243.100(a)(2). “Promptly means as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event 
after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day’s trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange)” after a senior official of the issuer knows or is reckless in not knowing that a 
nonintentional disclosure is both material and nonpublic. Id. at § 243.101(d). 
 77. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,719. 
 78. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2). Regulation FD shall not apply to disclosures made to the 
following: (1) a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer, (2) a person who 
expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence, (3) an entity whose primary 
business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided that the information is disclosed solely for the 
purpose of developing a credit rating and the entity’s ratings are publicly available, and (4) in 
connection with a securities offering. Id. 
 79. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,720 (noting that persons trading on the basis of ordinary-
course business-related communications would likely be liable under the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading for any misuse of the information).  
 80. Id. at 51,726. SEC enforcement actions could result in a cease-and-desist order, an 
injunction, or a fine. Id. 
 81. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102. 
 82. Id.  
 83. See ABA Letter, supra note 20 (“In practical terms, this provides a roadmap for a prima facie 
case for a private action claiming violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws 
because all of the elements of a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 under the Exchange Act 
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1. An Emphasis on Fairness  
The SEC premised Regulation FD on fairness considerations, asserting 
that even if selective disclosure did not violate insider trading laws under 
the personal benefit test, it unacceptably impaired market fairness.84 SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt condemned the practice of selective disclosure as 
a “stain on our markets,”85 and the final rule pledged to protect investor 
confidence in the market by combating the “unerodable informational 
advantages”86 gained from access to corporate insiders.87 The SEC cited 
several highly publicized instances of information leakages to illustrate the 
need for Regulation FD.88  
Additionally, the SEC believed Regulation FD would alleviate 
conflicts of interest between issuers and analysts.89 The SEC expressed 
concern that management was pressuring analysts to provide positive 
analysis in order to continue receiving selectively disclosed information.90 
will have been established, except for the elements of a purchase or sale and of reliance, which the 
courts may presume under the fraud on the market theory.”).  
 In any case, no one wanted to be the first to see exactly how this would work in the courts. For 
more discussion, see John P. Jennings, Recent Development, Regulation FD: SEC Reestablishes 
Enforcement Capabilities Over Selective Disclosure, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 543, 580 (2001) (illustrating 
how the remedial disclosures required to avoid a violation of Regulation FD may satisfy several 
elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action). 
 84. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,716 & n.7. The SEC was particularly concerned with the 
development of practices such as one-on-one conversations in which analysts were given material 
information rather than having to analyze nonmaterial information. Id.  
 85. Remarks by Chairman Arthur Levitt, The Lifeblood of Our Markets, at http://www.niri.org/ 
publications/alerts/levitt101999.cfm (Oct. 18, 1999). 
 86. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,716 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 
(1997) (citing Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979)). 
 87. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,716. The SEC asserted that no amount of research by the 
general public can substitute for the informational advantages obtained by securities analysts who 
receive selectively disclosed information. “Investors who see a security’s price change dramatically 
and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question whether 
they are on a level playing field.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 51,717. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy Over 
Possible Leak of Sluggish Sales Data, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at C1; ConAgra Excludes Investors 
From 3rd-Qtr Earnings Call, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 25, 1999; Goldman Falls After Warning on 
2nd-Quarter Profit, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 26, 2000, LEXIS; Pepsi Bottling Gives Select Group 
Early Look at Data, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 15, 2000, LEXIS. 
 89. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,716-17. 
 90. See id. at 51,716 (recognizing the potential for management to treat material information as a 
commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors). But cf. 
Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1043 (noting that the market would not provide business to analysts who 
consistently gave biased advice). 
 While Regulation FD attempted to reduce analyst bias by eliminating selective disclosure, many 
commentators have noted that biased analyst recommendations reflect broader structural problems in 
the investment banking industry. For a discussion of analyst conflicts of interest identified by the SEC, 
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The SEC anticipated Regulation FD would lead to more objective analysis 
and to more accurate recommendations from analysts.91 
Finally, the SEC intended Regulation FD to promote broader 
dissemination of information.92 The SEC stated that due to technological 
advancements that granted the investing public access to unprecedented 
levels of information, investors no longer needed analysts to act as 
information intermediaries.93 The SEC intended Regulation FD to 
encourage real time communications directly to the investing public.94  
2. Response to Regulation FD 
The Proposing Release95 of Regulation FD generated enormous public 
comment.96 Regulation FD received overwhelming acceptance from the 
investing public, and many commenters expressed surprise that existing 
law did not already prohibit this practice.97 However, other commenters, 
including issuers, securities industry participants, and professional and 
trade associations, criticized Regulation FD as an inappropriate response 
to selective disclosure.98 Although almost all of these commenters agreed 
see Lori Richards, Analysts Conflicts of Interest: Taking Steps to Remove Bias, at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch559.htm (May 8, 2002). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 501 (2002) (requiring the SEC to adopt rules to address securities analysts’ 
conflicts of interest by July 29, 2003). 
 91. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,717. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (“[T]echnological limitations no longer provide an excuse for abiding the threats to 
market integrity that selective disclosure represents.”). 
 However, the SEC ignored that, despite technological advances, the investing public continues to 
rely on securities professionals for their investment decisions. According to the SIA Survey, infra note 
99, 46% of surveyed investors depend on professional advisors for investment decisions. 
 94. Id. The SEC pointed out that issuers can broadly disseminate information directly to the 
market through Internet webcasting and teleconferencing. Id.  
 95. Supra note 18.  
 96. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,717 (stating that the Proposing Release generated nearly 
6,000 comment letters from the public, the majority from individual investors). See also, Merritt B. 
Fox, Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization’s Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 653, 654 (2001) (“Regulation FD is arguably the most important change to the U.S. disclosure 
regime since the adoption of integrated disclosure almost two decades ago.”).  
 97. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,718. However, these commenters most likely represent a 
sophisticated subset of the investing public. See SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Rethinking 
Disclosure in the Information Age: Can there Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch387.htm (June 26, 2000) (noting that over 5,000 of the comments from the investing 
public were received through e-mail, indicating the response was from an Internet savvy group) 
[hereinafter Unger, Rethinking Disclosure]; Editorial Staff, Most Individual Investors Haven’t Heard 
of Reg. FD, Investor Relations Business, Nov. 6, 2000 (citing a Paine Webber Group survey of 1,007 
randomly selected individual investors, finding that as many as 84% of participants had not heard of 
Regulation FD and only 55% were in favor of the new rule when it was explained to them). 
 98. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,717-18. See, e.g., SIA Letter, supra note 20 (“Given the recent 
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that selective disclosure of material nonpublic information was 
unacceptable,99 some claimed that the incidents of selective disclosure 
prompting Regulation FD amounted to highly publicized, rare occurrences 
that did not reflect the reality of the marketplace.100  
In addition, commenters expressed concern that the SEC implemented 
Regulation FD at an inopportune time, when the market was already 
responding on its own.101 When Regulation FD was released, many 
significant improvements had already made in the dissemination of 
material information to the public.102 However, the SEC dismissed appeals 
to encourage broader dissemination of information through guidance, 
rather than rulemaking.103  
trends toward more open disclosure and the relatively small number of instances of inappropriate 
selective disclosure, we find it very puzzling and troubling that the Commission is considering a step 
that we believe will operate to constrict the flow of information.”). 
 99. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,717. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 20 (“We do not 
countenance selective disclosure that seeks to provide an informational advantage to selected market 
participants, and we regularly counsel our clients to refrain from engaging in selective disclosure and 
to publicly disseminate material information that may have been selectively disclosed.”). See also 
NIRI, Standards of Practice for Investor Relations (Apr. 1998) at 27-37 (containing recommendations 
on how to avoid selective disclosure before the enactment of Regulation FD); Securities Industry 
Association, Costs and Benefits of Regulation Fair Disclosure (May 17, 2001), at 
http://www.sia.com/reg-fd/pdf/RegFD.pdf (“We favor a system that provides broad, non-
discriminatory dissemination of quality information.”) [hereinafter SIA Survey]. 
 100. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 20 (noting that the SEC provided primarily anecdotal 
evidence of selective disclosure, without reference to any “relevant economic or similar study 
evaluating . . . the breadth and market impact of selective disclosure activity”). 
 101. See, e.g., Letter from American Society of Corporate Secretaries, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/foran1.htm (Apr. 28, 2000) (“Given the rate of 
technological changes and the ability to get information out to the population at large, the general 
impression is that more universal disclosure is generally improving with issuers. We think this trend 
will continue without [Regulation FD].”); ABA Letter, supra note 20 (“[P]ublic companies, on their 
own initiative, are eliminating many of the problems of selective disclosure that apparently motivated 
the Commission to propose Regulation FD and are broadly disseminating information at an 
accelerating pace.”). 
 102. See, e.g., NIRI Executive Alert, Most Conference Calls Are Now Open to Individual 
Investors and the Media (Feb. 29, 2000), at http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/e9022900.cfm 
(discussing a survey of 225 public companies that found that nearly half of issuers who conducted 
analyst conference calls were broadcasting them live over the Internet and seventy-four percent 
permitted the media access to these calls); Association for Investment Management and Research, 
Financial Analysts Rate Conference Calls Best Source of Earnings Information in AIMR Survey, at 
http://www.aimr.org/infocentral /news/99releases/int-study.html (Feb. 16, 1999). 
 103. Many commenters believed that guidance promoting voluntary adherence to best practices 
would be more appropriate than rulemaking, based on recent improvements in issuer disclosures. See, 
e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 20 (urging the SEC to address selective disclosure through interpretive 
releases and private initiatives); Letter from American Society of Corporate Secretaries, supra note 
101 (requesting concrete examples of materiality contrasting with examples of close, but less than 
material, selective disclosure).  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p971 Mudd note book pages.doc1/13/2003   1:23 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
984 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:971 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Materiality Standard  
During the comment period for the proposed Regulation FD, 
commenters most frequently criticized the vague materiality standard, 
claiming that it would “chill” the flow of information in the market.104 
Commenters claimed that a clearer standard was necessary to avoid 
harmful side effects to market efficiency.105  
Regulation FD adopts the traditional definition of materiality 
developed in existing case law,106 which the SEC supplemented with 
references to other materiality standards.107 Although the SEC reassured 
commenters that it would not go after borderline cases,108 it also provided 
that issuers could not avoid a violation by breaking down material 
information into ostensibly immaterial pieces.109  
 104. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721. The use of the materiality standard in Regulation FD was 
the subject of many comments. Id. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 20 (“[W]e are concerned that the 
rulemaking approach adopted by the Commission . . . could have a pervasive impact on corporate 
information practices and runs a significant risk of chilling the accelerated pace of information flow to 
the markets.”). But cf., Letter from North American Securities Administrators Association to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/skolnik1.htm 
(Apr. 28, 2000) (“[T]he proposed rule strikes the right balance between fostering the continuous flow 
of information to the marketplace and fair and full disclosure to all investors.”). 
 105. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 20 (proposing an exclusive list identifying information that 
the SEC considers material or, alternatively, a materiality standard specific to Regulation FD). 
However, other commentators noted that attempts to provide a definition of materiality specific to 
Regulation FD could have implications on other areas of securities laws. See, e.g., Letters of North 
American Securities Administrators Association, supra note 104 (expressing concern that an attempt 
to define materiality for purposes of Regulation FD could have broader implications). 
 106. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 107. Id. at 51,721 & n.38 (referencing Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (“SAB 99”), 64 Fed. Reg. 
45,150 (Aug. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.211), which provides a materiality standard for 
purposes of financial statements). SAB 99 stands for the proposition that if a disclosure had a 
significant impact on trading in hindsight, it could be considered material. Id. at 45,152. Commentators 
have noted that inclusion of this standard is confusing and unclear. See, e.g., Unger Report Pinpoints 
Materiality: Reg. FD Study Shows Plenty of Room for Improvement, INVESTOR RELATIONS BUSINESS, 
Jan. 14, 2002 (stating that the SEC should clarify the interplay between Regulation FD and SAB 99 to 
alleviate concerns about hindsight materiality). 
 108. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,722 (“[I]ssuers need not fear being second guessed by the 
Commission in enforcement actions for mistaken judgments about materiality in close cases.”). 
However, the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Business Law Section of the 
American Bar Association, in their letter to the SEC, argued that indications that the SEC will exercise 
conservative prosecutorial judgment would make enforcements actions unpredictable. “Regulation 
premised on less than careful compliance is not sound policy because it runs the risk of (i) eroding the 
self-policing aspect of our securities regulatory system which is an important foundation of our 
market’s integrity or (ii) resulting in uneven and inconsistent compliance.” ABA Letter, supra note 20. 
 109. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721. Regulation FD will not be implicated where an issuer 
discloses immaterial information whose significance is discerned by the analyst. Id. at 51,722. 
However, an issuer cannot render material information immaterial by breaking it into ostensibly non-
material pieces. Id. at 51,721. 
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The SEC refused to clarify the standard of materiality, stating that 
flexibility was required to respond to the circumstances of each case.110 
The SEC provided examples of what could be considered material111 but 
indicated that the list of examples was not exhaustive.112 The SEC stated 
that it would be necessary to look at all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the disclosure113 and indicated that earnings guidance would 
receive enhanced scrutiny.114  
Recognizing the consternation that the materiality standard created, the 
SEC offered some tips for complying with Regulation FD.115 However, 
commenters generally viewed the tips as largely impracticable and 
unworkable.116 
III. ANALYSIS 
Regulation FD commendably encourages the broad dissemination of 
material information; however, by failing to define materiality, it 
 110. Id. “[W]e do not believe an appropriate answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line 
test, or an exclusive list of “material” items for purposes of Regulation FD.” Id. 
 111. Id. While declining to provide an exhaustive list, the SEC provided a list of items of 
information or events that should be “reviewed carefully” in determining materiality: (1) Earnings 
information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new 
products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers; (4) changes in control or in 
management; (5) change in auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an 
auditor’s audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer’s securities; and (7) bankruptcies or 
receiverships. Id. The SEC noted that some of these items are currently covered in Form 8-K reporting 
requirements. Id. at 51,721 n.47. The SEC also referenced NASD rules, suggesting that at least some 
of these items were already prohibited from selective disclosure under self-regulatory rules. Id. 
 112. Id. at 51,721. The SEC added that the items on the list were not per se material, “although 
some determinations will be reached more easily than others.” Id. 
 113. Id. (“A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of 
judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for 
ignoring the purposes of the securities acts and Congress’ policy decisions.”) (quoting Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. at 236).  
 114. See id. (suggesting that issuers should avoid any prospective disclosure regarding earnings). 
 115. Id. at 51,721 n.44. The SEC encouraged issuers to designate a limited number of persons who 
are authorized to make a disclosure or field inquiries from securities professionals; encouraged issuers 
to keep a record of communications with analysts; decline to answer sensitive questions until issuer 
personnel could consult with counsel; and seek time-limited confidentiality agreements from analysts. 
Id. 
 Some commentators suggested that the SEC create a safe harbor for firms that have strong 
policies in place to monitor disclosure, but the SEC declined. Id. See, e.g., Letter from the American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, supra note 101.  
 116. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721 n.44. For example, the suggestion to decline to answer 
sensitive questions until issuer personnel could consult with counsel was impracticable because real 
time questions do not provide time to consult with counsel. Furthermore, counsel was generally 
equally unsure of what could be disclosed. In response to these concerns, the SEC stated, “[w]e did not 
intend to suggest that issuers were required to implement any of these practices, but only offered them 
as suggestions.” Id. 
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unacceptably restricts the flow of immaterial information.117 The inability 
of issuers to differentiate between material and immaterial information 
prompted the Supreme Court in Dirks to allow some selective disclosure 
of material information through issuer and analyst communications in 
order to protect market efficiency.118 In adopting Regulation FD, the SEC 
promoted market fairness without responding to the risks to market 
efficiency envisioned in Dirks.119  
A. The Murky Materiality Standard 
Since the adoption of Regulation FD, commentators most frequently 
criticize the vague materiality standard.120 The subjective reasonable 
person standard potentially encompasses any information that produces a 
market reaction.121 “In fact, in something of a Catch 22, from the mere fact 
that a knowledgeable and experienced analyst asks a question, it could be 
argued that a reasonable investor would consider the answer important in 
making an investment decision.”122  
Although the reasonable person materiality standard functioned for 
many years in the context of insider trading law, it fails in the area of 
selective disclosure due to the need for real time materiality judgments.123 
When issuers engage in “rapid real time communications” with analysts, 
they must make “snap materiality judgments under often probing, difficult 
 117. See ABA Report, supra note 22 (noting that the uncertainties inherent in the materiality 
standard “create a tension between issuers and analysts that makes operation of the mosaic theory 
difficult”). 
 118. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See also Brountas, supra note 2, at 1549 (“The 
goal of securities regulation should not be to provide a “level playing field,” but to curb fraud while 
encouraging the search for and dissemination of information.”).  
 119. See Richards, supra note 70, at 439 (noting that Regulation FD could potentially eliminate 
the balance between efficiency and fairness created in Dirks). But cf. Horgan, supra note 69, at 667 
(predicting that Regulation FD will result in a more efficient market due to significant decreases in 
acquisition and verification costs). 
 120. See ABA Report, supra note 22 (“Materiality is the greatest point of stress under Regulation 
FD.”). See also Craft, supra note 25 (“One of the largest failures of Regulation FD is the SEC’s lack of 
any meaningful guidance or direction as to what information will and will not be considered 
material.”). 
 121. See ABA Letter, supra note 20 (stating that market reactions may reflect an unanticipated 
assessment of materiality, even after careful consideration of materiality by issuers); SIA Letter, supra 
note 20 (“In all the information authorized employees communicate to outsiders every day, or even to 
security analysts, it may be very hard to say what would not be considered ‘important’ by a reasonable 
shareholder in making an investment decision.”). 
 122. SIA Letter, supra note 20. 
 123. See ABA Letter, supra note 20 (stating the materiality decisions in the context of Regulation 
FD differ from the context of preparing a registration statement or periodic report). 
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circumstances.”124 Regulation FD chills spontaneous communications 
between issuers and analysts because issuers are necessarily more cautious 
and feel compelled to consult counsel more frequently.125  
In addition to the concerns raised regarding the reasonable person 
standard, the SEC’s reference to Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (“SAB 
99”) further complicates the materiality standard in Regulation FD.126 
Although members of the SEC Staff have indicated that SAB 99 codifies 
only existing principles and case law,127 many issuers and practitioners 
believe that SAB 99 establishes a lower threshold of materiality.128 In 
particular, SAB 99 subjects disclosures to hindsight assessments, based on 
the market’s response to a disclosure.129 As a result, issuers may be 
reluctant to disclose immaterial information out of fear that such 
information will have an effect on the market.130  
Rather than providing additional interpretive guidance about the types 
of information likely to be material, the SEC provided seven categories of 
information that the SEC indicated would likely be considered material.131 
Issuers, however, generally considered these items too broad to provide 
any real guidance.132 Furthermore, the SEC did not intend the list to be 
exhaustive;133 issuers still must apply good judgment in situations not 
addressed in the list.134 As a result, the items, in effect, merely refer the 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Letter from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton to Securities Exchange Commission at 
http://www.sec.ov/rules/proposed/s73199/cleary1.htm (Apr. 28, 2000) (noting that the result would be 
“less of the spontaneous candid disclosure that is not found in more formal disclosure documents such 
as press releases and Form 8-K filings”). For example, an issuer may wish to avoid dialogue with 
analysts and investors, or to suspend dialogue in order to confer with counsel. Id. 
 126. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. For further discussion on SAB 99, see Glenn F. 
Miller, Comment, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray into the Murky World 
of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361 (2000). 
 127. ABA Report, supra note 22. 
 128. See ABA Letter, supra note 20 (stating that the breadth of SAB 99 “will make materiality 
judgments required by Regulation FD more difficult and will expose companies to after-the-fact 
assessments of their materiality judgments”).  
 129. See ABA Report, supra note 22. Market reaction is a key factor of materiality under SAB 99, 
which can only be determined with the benefit of hindsight. Id.  
 130. Id. (“It may be too delicate an endeavor in light of SAB 99 to discern whether information is 
not material and is yet significant to an analyst’s understanding of a company.”). For example, an 
issuer may disclose information that it believes, after careful consideration, is not material. However, 
if the information allows an analyst to make a material inference based on information the analyst 
obtained from other sources, the disclosure may have a material price on market price and violate 
Regulation FD. See supra note 121. 
 131. See supra note 111.  
 132. “[T]he seven categories have provided more confusion than clarity about what materiality 
means under the Reg FD regime.” Unger Report, infra note 137. 
 133. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721. 
 134. See Richard H. Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks before the 
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issuer back to the reasonable person standard.135  
In addition, the SEC stated that disclosures regarding earnings 
guidance are almost always material.136 However, the SEC failed to clarify 
earnings guidance,137 despite the fact that almost all disclosures relate to 
earnings in some manner.138 Furthermore, the SEC failed to indicate when 
issuers can confirm prior public guidance to an analyst without being 
liable for the selective disclosure of new information.139 
B. Market Efficiency: Realizing the Warnings of Dirks 
In adopting Regulation FD, the SEC made explicit that it did not intend 
to limit the collection of immaterial information.140 However, the vague 
standard of materiality applied in Regulation FD potentially makes it too 
difficult for issuers to determine what is immaterial.141 As a result, 
Regulation FD restricts an analyst’s ability to “ferret out”142 immaterial 
information from an issuer or question information provided by the issuer. 
For example, before Regulation FD, issuers commonly allowed analysts to 
ask questions and seek explanations.143 As a result, analysts were able to 
discover new information and challenge information provided in order to 
Compliance and Legal Division of the Securities Industry Association, at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch415.htm (Nov. 1, 2000). 
 135. See Craft, supra note 25, at 156 (stating that the list of items “do little more than refer the 
issuer to the already murky case law on the issue of materiality”). 
 136. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721 (“When an issuer official engages in a private discussion 
with an analyst who is seeking guidance about earnings estimates, he or she takes on a high degree of 
risk under Regulation FD. If the issuer official communicates selectively to the analyst nonpublic 
information that the company’s anticipated earnings will be higher than, lower than, or even the same 
as what the analysts have been forecasting, the issuer likely will have violated Regulation FD.”). 
 137. According to a report prepared by SEC Commissioner Laura Unger examing Regulation FD 
one year after its effective date, it is unclear what information falls under the rubric of earnings 
information. Commissioner Unger recommended that the SEC should clarify “earnings information” 
by indicating if certain income items are more likely to be deemed material than others. See 
Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited (Dec. 6, 2001), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm [hereinafter Unger Report]. 
 138. Craft, supra note 25, at 155 (stating that practically any information disclosed could have 
some attenuated relation to earnings).  
 139. Id. (noting that the SEC has not clarified relevant factors for determining when it is 
appropriate to confirm prior guidance). 
 140. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,722 (stating that analysts “provide a valuable service in 
sifting through and extracting information that would not be significant to the ordinary investor” and 
that “[w]e do not intend, by Regulation FD, to discourage this sort of activity”). 
 141. See Dirks, supra note 8, at 658 n.17 (labeling the case law materiality standard used in 
Regulation FD as “inherently imprecise”). 
 142. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
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evaluate a company.144 However, under Regulation FD, issuers are more 
likely to avoid informal communications altogether.145  
The broad materiality standard also prohibits issuers from selectively 
disclosing information to analysts that cannot be disseminated to the 
public for various reasons.146 For example, before Regulation FD, issuers 
had an incentive to selectively disclose long-term sales projections to an 
analyst in order to disseminate the information without risking legal 
exposure.147 As a result, the market price would more accurately reflect 
business prospects without creating legal risks.148 However, under 
Regulation FD, the broad standard of materiality makes it unclear what 
information issuers can selectively provide to analysts. Rather than risk 
violation of Regulation FD, the rule encourages issuers to withhold 
information that cannot be provided to the public at large. 
C. Effects of Regulation FD 
Since the adoption of Regulation FD, numerous industry and other 
groups have performed studies to assess Regulation FD’s impact on the 
market.149 In addition, the SEC convened a roundtable discussion six 
months after the rule’s effective date to monitor the impact of Regulation 
 144. See SIA Survey, infra note 99. Informal communications were particularly important in the 
case of small issuers, who often cannot bear the expense of frequent public disclosures. For a 
discussion of Regulation FD’s potential disparate impact on small issuers, see Craft, supra note 25, at 
157. 
 145. See, e.g., Rayne Wolfe, Fair Disclosure Rule Puts Businesses on Edge Fear of Improperly 
Divulging Financial Information Stifles Many, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT, Nov. 19, 2000 (noting 
company chose to skip investment conferences rather than risk disclosing inappropriate information) 
[hereinafter Wolfe, Fair Disclosure]. See also SIA Survey, infra note 149 (stating that although 
Regulation FD encouraged more fundamental analysis, no amount of analysis compensates for lack of 
discussion with management). 
 146. See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1028-29. Issuers prefer informal contacts with analysts as a 
means of providing information for several reasons. First, for competitive reasons the issuer may wish 
to disclose information in substance while withholding the details. Id. at 1029. Second, the issuer may 
fear liability for publicly disclosing speculative information about the company’s prospects. Id. Third, 
the issuer may wish to bond the accuracy of the information. Id. at 1030. Finally, the issuer may 
believe that it can gain more analyst coverage if it provides an analyst with exclusive access. Id. at 
1030-31. 
 147. Id. at 1029. 
 148. Id. at 1029 & n.24. 
 149. See SIA Survery, supra note 99 (summarizing the results of the SIA’s interviews with 30 buy 
and sell side analysts, the National Investors Relations Institute’s (NIRI) survey of 577 issuing 
companies, and the Association for Investment Management and Research’s (AIMR) survey of 423 
buy and sell side analysts); Unger Report, supra note 137 (summarizing eight FD-related studies 
performed by Thomson Financial, the NIRI, the AIMR, the American Bar Association, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the SIA); ABA Report, supra note 22 (summarizing the results of 
various studies performed on the effects of Regulation FD). 
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FD.150 These studies generated different information regarding the effects 
of Regulation FD, generally reflecting the different perspectives of the 
constituencies responding.151 However, these studies provide a useful 
starting point for identifying areas of concern.  
 
 
1. Quantity of Information 
Although most studies indicated that Regulation FD provides market 
participants relatively equal access to information,152 the responses varied 
as to whether Regulation FD restricts the amount of information available. 
Issuers generally claimed that the same amount or more information was 
being provided,153 reporting continued face-to-face meetings with 
analysts.154 In contrast, analysts and portfolio managers generally believed 
that Regulation FD chilled issuer communications.155 According to a 
Securities Industry Association study,156 many issuers have curtailed 
communications with analysts, providing fewer one-on-one discussions 
and replacing free dialogue in such meetings with scripted statements and 
references to already public material.157  
Any restriction on information means that even if all investors receive 
information at the same time, issuers are providing less information 
overall.158 As information is crucial for properly valuing securities159 and 
 150. See Unger Report, supra note 137 (summarizing the discussion at the roundtable). 
 151. See ABA Report, supra note 22. 
 152. See Unger Report, supra note 137 (summarizing the results of various studies performed on 
the effects of Regulation FD). 
 153. Id. (citing a wire service that claimed the number of earnings guidance releases increased 
more than tenfold and webcast announcements nearly quadrupled since the enactment of Regulation 
FD).  
 154. Id. (citing NIRI study finding that 80% of issuers continued to hold one-on-one meetings 
after the enactment of Regulation FD). 
 155. Id. (citing ABA survey reporting that securities attorneys claimed that the number of their 
clients providing one-on-one meetings dropped from 77% to 27% after the enactment of Regulation 
FD; AIMR study finding that 69% of buy-side and 70% of sell-side analysts reported fewer one-on-
one meeting after the enactment of Regulation FD). 
 156. SIA Survey, supra note 99. 
 157. See, e.g., Unger Report, supra note 137 (citing an analyst who claims that issuers are no 
longer willing to complete paper questionnaires requesting general background information due to 
Regulation FD); Lee Clifford, The SEC Wants to Open the Info Vault: Regulation FD Sounds Great on 
Paper, but Will It Help Investors Know More About the Companies They Own?, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, 
Nov. 13, 2000, at 434 (noting that guidance through one-on-one meetings with analysts is “history”); 
Get Ready for the Regulation FD Shakedown Cruise, PHILLIPS BUSINESS INFORMATION, INC., Sept. 
11, 2000 (noting that reviewing analysts’ drafts, holding one-on-one meetings with analysts, and 
attending analysts’ conferences are three major areas of risk that issuers should avoid). But cf., id. 
(“[T]his period with a lot of gray area . . . does give investor and corporate communications 
professionals a chance to redefine it.”).  
 158. See Clifford, supra note 157 (“It’s great to be on a par with Goldman and Fidelity, but not if 
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ensuring an efficient market,160 less information in the market is a 
significant concern. In the final analysis, it appears that Regulation FD 
makes it much easier for issuers to withhold information from the 
public.161 
2. Quality of Information 
Studies performed since the adoption of Regulation FD suggest that 
issuers provide less valuable information under Regulation FD. Although 
some issuers reported providing information of the same or better 
quality,162 other issuer studies reported instances of lower quality 
information.163 Analysts generally reported deterioration in the quality of 
written and oral issuer communications, indicating that many issuers 
responded to Regulation FD by replacing explanations with boilerplate 
language.164  
By requiring broad public disclosure of information that may be 
deemed material, Regulation FD encourages issuers to disseminate raw 
data independent of context and analysis; however, providing equal access 
to raw data is useful only to those with the expertise and time to analyze 
it.165 Even if the public is able to effectively use such information, no 
you’re all getting blindsided together.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Smart Investors Let Others Do the Work, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 16, 2000, at A23 (“[T]he value of information to the small investor is that it becomes 
incorporated in a company’s stock price, signalling to senior management the market’s best collective 
judgment on a company’s plans for generating a long-run return.”).  
 A properly valued security is priced based on all available information. Some commentators have 
suggested that the risk of selective disclosure is included in the price paid by the investor; as this is a 
beta risk that can be wholly diversified away, it should not be such a large concern. For further 
discussion, see Fox, supra note 96, at 672 & n.61. 
 160. For more discussion, see Fox, supra note 96, at 674-75. 
 161. See Craft, supra note 25, at 158. “[I]t does not necessarily follow that, just because the SEC 
has made it more difficult for the issuer to communicate with the analyst, the issuer will choose to 
provide the same amount of information to the public.” Id. 
 162. See Unger Report, supra note 137 (citing ABA survey reporting that securities attorneys 
claimed that 50% of their clients provide the same quality of information and 30.6% of their clients 
provide better quality information after the enactment of Regulation FD).  
 163. Id. (citing NIRI survey finding that the percentage of issuers willing to review analyst 
earning models has declined from 81% to 53%; Thomson Financial survey finding that 29.4% have 
less frequent contact with analysts and investors). 
 164. Id. (citing SIA survey finding that 72% of analysts feel that information communicated by 
issuers to the public is of low quality after the enactment of Regulation FD; AIMR survey stating that 
62% of analysts report candor has deteriorated after the enactment of Regulation FD). 
 165. See SIA Survey, supra note 99. See Unger, Rethinking Disclosure, supra note 97 (“[W]e 
have to remember that information can only empower investors if they understand it and can 
effectively apply it.”). Many investors are incapable of making sound investment decisions on the 
basis of raw, unanalyzed information. See, e.g., Wolfe, Fair Disclosure, supra note 145 (citing a 
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amount of independent investigation can compensate for discussion with 
senior management in the case of large or new companies with complex or 
technical business models. Furthermore, Regulation FD renders analysts 
unable to even challenge information provided by issuers in an attempt to 
validate the information provided.166  
Additionally, the elusive standard of materiality leaves issuers unsure 
of what information can still be provided to analysts. General counsel 
tends to provide overly cautious advice in order to avoid the gray area.167 
Despite SEC assurances that issuers need not fear being second-guessed 
by the Commission in enforcement actions for mistaken judgments about 
materiality in close cases,168 issuers have generally taken an extremely 
cautious stance, unwilling to put these assurances to the test.169  
IV. PROPOSAL: REDUCING THE CHILLING IMPACT OF REGULATION FD 
A. Limit the Materiality Standard to Specified Information 
The SEC should provide a definition of materiality in Regulation FD 
that limits material information or events to listed occurrences, creating a 
rebuttable presumption that disclosure of any such item is a violation.170 
February 1997 survey conducted by the National Association of Securities Dealers that found that 
while 60% of Americans know the difference between a halfback and a quarterback, only 14% know 
the difference between a growth stock and an income stock). 
 166. See Paul A. Ferrillio, Reexamining Corporate Disclosure Practices, CORPORATE 
COUNSELOR, Nov. 2000 (noting analysts generally may not demand follow-up questions to 
information contained in a release during one-on-one meeting without violating Regulation FD). 
 167. See, e.g., Lisa I. Fried, Selective Disclosure: Proposed SEC Regulation Raises Compliance 
Issues, 223 N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 2000, at 5 (noting that counsel will be forced to guess what impact 
company information will have on a volatile market). 
 168. See supra note 108. 
 169. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 145 (“I’m keeping a detailed log—everyone I talk to—and I 
make a notation every time I have to say, ‘Sorry, that question[s] [sic.] is over the line.’” (quoting Jeff 
Finn, director of investment relations for Advanced Fibre Communications)). 
 170. The SEC should amend Regulation FD to limit material information to the enumerated events 
that are currently “reviewed carefully,” see supra note 111, to Regulation FD should include the 
following definition of materiality:  
Material. A selective disclosure of information will be presumed to be material if it pertains to 
any of the following events: (1) earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, 
joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or developments 
regarding customers or suppliers; (4) changes in control or in management; (5) changes in 
auditors or auditor notification that issuer may no longer rely on an auditor’s audit report; (6) 
events regarding the issuer’s securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships.  
 The Defendant shall bear the burden of rebutting any such presumption by proof that the 
event in question was not in actuality material. 
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Currently, the SEC fails to define materiality in Regulation FD, adopting 
the standard developed in case law and listing some types of information 
or events that will be “reviewed carefully.”171 However, the uncertainty 
inherent in this definition unacceptably restricts an analyst’s ability to get 
immaterial information.  
By providing a definition, the SEC could prohibit material 
announcements to private audiences without prohibiting the analyst from 
performing his traditional role of questioning management. Providing a 
bright-line definition would also reduce the chilling effect Regulation FD 
has on the quantity and quality of information by allowing issuers to 
structure their communications in accordance with Regulation FD without 
incurring liability. In addition, a bright-line definition would reduce the 
legal costs expended by issuers in order to receive guidance on what can 
be disclosed. The largest Regulation FD-related expense for issuers has 
been identified as the legal work involved in the determination of the 
materiality of information.172  
Some commentators have expressed concern that a new definition of 
materiality for Regulation FD may create confusion in other areas of 
securities law.173 However, as Regulation FD is a reporting requirement 
that was created to respond directly to selective disclosure, this concern is 
not justified. Because issuer and analyst communications require 
continuous real time judgments regarding materiality, Regulation FD 
should not subject the practice of selective disclosure to the broad 
definition of materiality developed in anti-fraud case law. 
The SEC opposes a bright-line test because it believes that any 
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always 
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality 
necessarily must be over- or under-inclusive.174 In the case of Regulation 
FD, however, a narrower standard of materiality could effectively protect 
investor confidence in the market. A bright-line test would ensure 
investors that issuer-analyst communications were greatly curtailed, 
without impairing the ability of the analyst to provide sound 
 171. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721.  
 172. SIA Survey, supra note 99. 
 173. Some commentators have noted that creating a new definition of materiality for Regulation 
FD may create confusion in other areas of securities law. See supra note 105. However, these fears are 
misplaced. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 174. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 51,721 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 236). 
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recommendations. In fact, as investors rely on security analysts for 
investment decisions,175 without a clearer definition of materiality 
Regulation FD has the ironic effect of limiting the flow of valuable 
information available to the investing public.176  
B. Clarify the Materiality Standard with Additional Examples  
If the SEC is unwilling to create an exclusive list of events that would 
be material, it should at least provide more guidance on materiality. More 
guidance should come in the form of an interpretive release issued by the 
SEC to make its position on materiality clearer.177 For example, the SEC 
should provide situational examples of both acceptable and prohibited 
issuer disclosures. In addition, the SEC should clarify the interplay 
between Regulation FD and SAB 99, allowing issuers to know what 
impact the SEC intends subsequent stock price movements to have on 
materiality.178 This guidance would provide issuers the necessary 
reassurance that disclosures of immaterial information are not actionable. 
Although the SEC may be concerned that any additional guidance will 
restrict its ability to apply Regulation FD to the facts and circumstances of 
each case, failure to provide such guidance weakens the effectiveness of 
Regulation FD by making enforcement actions unpredictable. Regulation 
FD represents a hard-line approach to selective disclosure, despite the 
SEC’s respect for the role of analysts.179 Issuers and analysts deserve the 
opportunity to structure their transactions in accordance with SEC 
guidance rather than on reliance on SEC statements that Regulation FD is 
not meant to entrap and will be applied loosely.180 
V. CONCLUSION 
The SEC continues to endorse the role of the analyst as necessary for 
the preservation of a healthy market. However, as demonstrated by the 
enactment of Regulation FD, the SEC fails to recognize that a vague 
materiality standard inhibits material and immaterial disclosures alike. A 
 175. See supra note 93. 
 176. See SIA Survey, supra note 99 (finding that the 88 million owners of equity mutual funds 
will be disadvantaged to the extent that brokers and fund managers rely on research and 
recommendations produced by analysts). 
 177. See Unger Report, supra note 137. 
 178. Id.  
 179. See supra note 140. 
 180. See supra note 108. 
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clear definition of materiality would allow Regulation FD to protect 
market integrity without restricting the analysts’ ability to obtain the 
information necessary to complete the mosaic. 
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